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Abstract
    I investigate capital movements under capital market imperfections in an endogenously growing 
economy. According to the classical or standard model of international monetary theory, capital fl ows 
from rich to poor countries because marginal productivity of capital that equals to interest rate in poor 
countries is higher than that in rich countries. In the actual world, however, the capital in most of 
developing countries flows out to the foreign financial market. In this paper, I show that the interest 
rates depend on the monitoring cost or verification cost which is the cost to verify or to monitor 
the realized return of borrowers' investment projects. Under then assumption that verification cost 
depends on the existing capital in an economy, the relation between verifi cation cost and interest rate 
determines the direction of capital movements. If growth of economy leads to the decreases in the cost 
of verifi cation,capital in developing countries fl ows out to developed countries.
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1.  Introduction
     Capital Flight is a much important problem in developing countries. Capital fl ight leads to a decrease 
in the funds that are sources of domestic investments.
      According to the classical or standard model of international monetary theory,capital fl ows from rich 
to poor countries because marginal productivity of capital that equals to interest rate in poor countries 
is higher than that in rich countries. However, in the actual world, the capital in most of developing 
countries fl ows out to the foreign fi nancial market, especially, to European fi nancial market1).
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Ჰ The detail structure of capital fl ight is shown in Kuroyanagi and Hamada(l993)
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        The approach of capital market imperfections has widely recognized under the world where there is 
an asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. By incorporating the concept of capital market 
imperfections into macroeconomics, that approach are able to explain some economic phenomenon 
which cannot be understood by standard theory (for example, see Banerjee and Newman(1988), 
Galor and Zeira(1988), Williamson(1989) and so on)2). It is shown in this paper that how the capital 
movements occur under capital market imperfections in an endogenous growth model, which is a variant 
of Romer(1986) and Lucas(1988): externalities give rise to a production function with increasing return 
to scale. Gertler and Rogoff(1990) provides a model of international capital movement with asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers. Gertler and Rogoff( 1990) has shown that net worth of 
borrowers in rich countries may work to reduce or possibly offset capital outfl ows to poor countries. 
Also Hamada and Sakuragawa(1993) which develops Gertler and Rogoff to a dynamic model shows that 
too hasty liberalization of domestic capital market in developing country may worsen the long-run state 
of country through fl ight of capital.
      I provide a model which introduces the endogenously growing economy into the costly-state-
verification approach developed by Townsend(1979). Under the assumption that verification cost 
depends on the existing capital in an economy, the relation between verifi cation cost and interest rate 
determines the direction of capital movements. The important implication of this paper is that if an 
increase in capital in an economy leads to a decrease in verifi cation cost, capital fl ows from developing 
country with less capital to developed country.
      Next section provides a basic endogenous growth model with contract problem,section 3 discuss two 
countries case and analyzes the capital movements.
2.  The Model
　      Consider two-period overlapping-generations model. The economy is composed countable infi nity 
agents. There is no population growth. Agents are either lenders or entrepreneurs, where a fraction a of 
agents is a lender, and 1 -a fraction of agents is an entrepreneur. There are two types of goods: the one is 
consumption good, the other is capital good. The price of consumption good is numeraire. Both agents 
are protected by liability constraint.
      Each lender is endowed with one unit of labor force, and he supplies inelastically his labor force to 
a fi rm owner and can earn the wage at the fi rst period of his life. Each lender born at period t maximizes 
the expected value of the utility  where  is consumption at 
 i ( i = t,t+l),  is the quantity of effort expended to verify entrepreneur's (or fi rm owner's) returns,and 
 is the subjective gross discount rate. All lenders have an unbounded effort at period t+1.
      Each lender differs in the subjective discount rate, which follows a continuously differentiable 
Ჱ Sakuragawa and Hamada(l992) and Pagano(l993) provide the survey of relation between capital market imperfections 
and economic development.
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probability distribution function H( ) with a positive density h( ) over the support . Let 
denote the interest rate prevailing between period t and t+1, which will be determined endogenously. In 
period t each lender chooses whether to save or to consume the wage income at period t. Any lenders 
who face p equal to or less than  .  lends the wage income to others, while anyone who faces p more 
than   does not lend to others and consume all the wage income at the fi rst period of his life. As a result, 
H( ) is the measure of lenders who lend to others,while 1-H( )  is the measure of lenders who never 
lend to others.
       Each entrepreneur consumes only in period t+1 and maximizes the expected consumption. Each 
entrepreneur receives no endowment in either period, but has access to only one investment project at 
period t and has production technology of consumption good at the beginning of period t+1.
       The investment project at period t produces the capital good (namely physical capital) that will be 
able to input into entrepreneurs' consumption good production at period t+1. The production technology 
of investment good is AK-type under which one unit of input at the beginning of period t yields an 
uncertain  units of output at the end of period t.  is the project-specific shock and  follows a 
uniform distribution over the support of [0, ]  with a mean of  . For simplicity, we assume that A=l.
        Although the distribution of  is public information, actual realization of  is private information. 
Each entrepreneur is able to observe freely but lenders need a verification costs in order to observe 
entrepreneur's actual output.
Lenders must expend B( )  unit of effort as the verification costs in order to observe entrepreneur's 
actual realization of project when an amount of inputs is .   or  3).
     In period t+1 entrepreneurs will become firm-owners who produce the consumption 
good using the Cobb-Douglas type production technology with Marshallian externality: 
 , where  is the average capital  stock per fi rm  at period t+1. 
Rearranging to per capita term,  we obtain
 , where     and  
       Each fi rm-owner behaves competitively taking   as given. Considering an equilibrium in which 
 ,   is satisfi ed, competitive factor markets require that
                    (1)      (2)     
where (1) implies that the marginal product of labor is equal to the wage rate, and (2) implies that the 
marginal product of capital is equal to the interest rate. Capital depreciates fully after one period.
Ჲ This assumption of the relation between verification cost and input size(equal to existing capital in next period) is 
important factor which determines the direction of capital movements in section3.
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2-1. Contracting Problem
       In period t+1 entrepreneurs become fi rm owners with capital good. Capital good at period t+1 is the 
output of project operated at period t. However, since entrepreneurs do not have endowment they have to 
borrow the funds to operate their project. Since the realization of project is private information, lenders 
have to write a contract with entrepreneurs.
      We assume that the firm owner repays his promised interest for lenders after production of 
consumption good at period t+1.
 Since the production technology is , and the amount of capital good is  when the 
size of inputs of investment project at period t is  , the fi rm-owner will be able to receive  
as the production return at period t+1.
       The optimal contract between lenders and borrowers is the debt contract shown by Gale and 
Hellwig(1981) and Williamson(1986). Suppose that S is a set in which verification occurs and Sc 
is the complement. , then verification occurs,and if , then it does not occur. Since 
the entrepreneur receives  units of consumption good per unit of investment after production of 
consumption good at the beginning of period t+1, then we can consider a gross loan interest rate  
satisfying that
                    (3)  and   (4) 
From (3) and (4) we are able to consider that a cut off  exists.
Whenever  the entrepreneur reports , and pays   per unit, while whenever 
,the entrepreneur anounces  truthfully, verifi cation occurs , and the lenders receive all the 
profi ts.
The optimal problem between an entrepreneur who borrows It units of consumption good and a lender is 
as follows:
                    (5)   
subject to
                    (6)   
Using (6), (5) is rewritten to
                    (7)   
A Consideration on the Directions of Capital Movements under Capital Market Imperfections 
As a result, (5) and (6) are replaced by
                    (8)   
subject to
                    (9)   
Considering only the equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs receive equal loans, and from (5) and(6),
.
(10)    
Differentiating (10) with respect to  , we obtain
                    (11)  
Study now the determine the equilibrium. We impose the following restriction on parameter value to 
guarantee an equilibrium with positively-valued variables.
Assumption         
  Therefore,  for some . Under the Assumption,  is strictly concave 
in . It is useful to specify the pair of interest rate which maximizes the lender's profi ts, so from (11), 
we obtain
                    (11')  
In this economy, since there is an infi nite competitive entrepreneur, no one can earn excess profi t. The 
zero-profi t condition for the entrepreneur is
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                    (12)   
The market clearing condition for capital is
                    (13)   
where L.H.S of (13) implies aggregate demand for loans and R.H.S of (13) represents aggregate supply 
of loans.
Defi nition
       There are two types of equilibria: one is no-rationing equilibrium (NRE) and the other is associated 
with credit rationing (RE).
        1. An NRE is a sequence of endogenous variables  , satisfying
(1), (2), (10), (12) and (13), where  is given.
        2.    An RE is a sequence of endogenous variables   , satisfying
(1), (2), (10), (11') and (13), where  ,   is given.
      Hereafter, only consider the economy in RE. Since our purpose is to show the relation economic 
growth and capital market imperfections. From (11'), . And incorporate this result 
into (10),  . The equilibrium is   characterized by the pair
 
which maximizes the intermediary's profit, given the interest rate  . The figure 1 illustrates the 
intermediary's profi t function and entrepreneur's zero-profi t condition(downward-slowping solid straight 
line). The equilibrium is not determined by the intersection of  and (12), denoted by 
F. The equilibrium is determined by point E.Since, at this point, intermediary's profit is maximized, 
intermediary has no incentive to raise the loan interest.
    Note that (12) is irrelevant to the determination of equilibrium, but rather the entrepreneur earns
                    
per unit of capital. The entrepreneur is credit rationed in the sense that he would be willing to pay higher 
loan interest rates in order to apply for a greater amount of loan,but the offer is rejected. The credit ration 
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is summarized as follows.
Proposition 1
      Consider the pair    which satisfi es (10), (11!) and (13).
If the pair     satisfi es  , then equilibrium is no-rationing equilibrium 
(NRE).
If the pair    satisfies  , then equilibrium is associated with credit 
rationing (RE).
Figure1
2-2. On Growth Rate
      Consider only the economy in RE. The amount of capital per capita existing on average at the 
beginning of period t+1,  , is  
                    (14)  
Incorporate (13) into (14) and then we obtain  . It follows from 
 in RE,
                    
It is diffi cult to show the dynamic process of growth rate.
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3. Capital Movements
      The purpose of this section is to show the capital movements under which capital markets are 
opened between two countries. Only the difference in two countries is the amount of existing capital: 
one is developed country with much capital, the other is developing country with less capital. Capital 
movements are shown to compare the interest rate in both countries.
    At fi rst, we examine the case of which capital accumulation leads to an increase in the verifi cation 
costs:  In this case, the verification cost in developed country is more expensive than that in 
developed country. Differentiation of the interest rate with respect to the existing capital,
                    ,
under Assumption. This implies that the interest rate in developed country higher than that in developing 
country and capital fl ows from developed country to developing country.
    Next case is that capital accumulation leads to a decrease in verifi cation cost: . We can see the 
result by same method of fi rst case.
                    ,
under Assumption   . This implies that the interest rate in developed country lower than that in 
developing country and capital fl ows from developing country to developed country.
Proposition 2
1. Suppose that capital accumulation leads to an increase in verification cost. Capital flows from a 
country with much capital to a country with less capital.
2. Suppose that capital accumulation leads to a decrease in verifi cation cost. Capital fl ows from a country 
with much capital to a country with less capital.
4 .   Conclusion
       We show that the relation between an amount of existing capital and verification cost would 
determine the direction of capital movements. An important result is that if the amounts of capital lead to 
an decrease the verifi cation cost, capital fl ows from developed country with much capital to developing 
country with less capital. However,this result almost owes the assumption associated with the relation 
between an amount of existing capital and verification cost. This must be supported by empirical 
evidence. This will be my future research.
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